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| The December Revolt and the Coup D'Etat - 1989Notes and Bibliography
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1. In the aftermath of the 'revolution', Romanians examining the assets of the Securitate concluded that stories purporting to tell, for example, of how the Securitate had bugged every room in Bucharest, were largely exaggerated. Even the extent of the secret underground network of tunnels and chambers had been greatly exaggerated. 2 See, Lieutenant General Ion Mihai Pacepa, Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief (Washington, DC, 1987). 3. See, e.g., Peter Deriabin and T. H. Bagley, KGB Masters of the Soviet Union (New York, 1990), p.358. 4. East Berlin ADN International Service, 24 Dec. 1989, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report. Eastern Europe (hereafter cited as FBIS-EEU), 26 Dec. 1989, p. 27. 5. E.g., the case history of an ethnic Hungarian living in Romania, Gyula Lemperger, who purportedly worked for the Securitate in conducting intelligence activities on Hungarian territory between 1984 and 1986. See interview with Colonel Lagos Nagy, head of the Hungarian National Security Office, in Nepszabadsag, as described in MTI (Budapest), 0954GMT, 6 March 1990, in FBIS-EEU, 9 March 1990, p. 55. 6. Eastern Europe News letter, Vol. 3, No. 12 (14 June 1989), p. 4. 7. See Mihai Sturdza, 'How Dead Is Ceausescu SecretPoliceForce?', Radio Free Europe: Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1, No. 15 (13 April 1990), p. 31. Also, Virgil Magureanu on Bucharest Domestic Service, 1200GMT, 22 Nov. 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 27 Nov. 1990, pp.54-9. 9. Interview with General Stanculescu on Bucharest Domestic Service, 2000 GMT, 27 Feb. 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 28 Feb. 1990, p.65. 11. Pacepa, Red Horizons, p.211. 12. New York Times, 29 Aug. 1990. 13. Interview with Stanculescu, op. cit. 14. Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 125. 16. William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy (Cambridge, MA, 1982), p.215. 18. The Military Balance 1989-1990 (London, 1989), p. 51. 19. SeeLewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy (Cambridge, MA, 1982), , p.215. 20. Some Securitate forces were reported to have opposed using force to suppress the protests. See Eastern Europe Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 12 (l4 June 1989), p. 4. 22. The Military Balance 1989-1990 (London, 1989), p. 51. 23. Homostean was a member of the 'old guard' of Securitate members, who had worked closely with Soviet intelligence back in the 1940s and 1950s. Although information on why he was replaced is not available, it is clear that he was disgraced politically, since he was exiled to the post of ambassador to Czechoslovakia. 24. Eastern Europe Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 12 (l4 June 1989), p. 4. 25. Vlad was arrested after the revolution and accused of having ordered the arrest and imprisonment of protesters on 21 Dec. 1981. See Rompres (Bucharest), 1307GMT, 27 Nov. 1990, in FBIS-EEU, 29 Nov. 1990, pp. 6l-2. 26. Cazimir Ionescu and Silviu Brucan, quoted in Sturdza, 'How Dead Is Ceausescu's Secret Police Force?', p.28. 27. Pacepa's book is notably lacking in information on KGB ties to the Romanian intelligence services or a detailed description of the structure of the DIE. Pacepa, Red Horizons. 28. See, generally, Vladimir Tismaneanu, 'Personal Power and Political Crisis in Romania', Government and Opposition, Vol.24, No.2 (Spring 1989), pp. 177-98. 29. See Dr. Nicholas Dima, 'Communist Romania: A Model of Social Decay', Military Intelligence (Oct. 1987), pp.22-5. 30. Vladimir Tismaneanu, 'Personal Power and Political Crisis', p. 189. As Tismaneanu points out, the first signs of growing unrest were evident in 1987; long before the presumably more restive peoples of the 'northern tier' countries had begun taking to the streets. Massive protests and riots shook the town of Brasov on 15 November 1987. The largest student demonstrations to take place in Romania since 1968 occurred in the town of Iasi in May 1987. A discussion of possible scenarios for leadership succession following Ceausescu's departure from the scene were discussed in Vladimir Socor, 'Toward a Post-Ceausescu Leadership in Romania', Radio Free Europe Report, RAD Background Report/5, Eastern Europe, 10 Jan. 1986. 31. See Brigitte Sauerwein and Matthias Plugge, 'Glasnost in the Romanian Armed Forces', In ternational Defense Review, No. 12 (1989), pp. 1611-13. 34. 'Les cinq actes d'une manipulation', Le Point, No. 922 (2l May 1990), pp.43-9, esp. p.43. 35. See Cuvintul, No. 5 (28 Feb. 1990), as described in Michael Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', Radio Free Europe: Report on Eastern Europe, Vol.I, No.41 (12 Oct. 1990), pp.29- 42, especially p.34. 36. See, generally, Jonathan Eyal, 'The Case of Romania: A Lesson for East and West', in The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Defence Yearbook 1990 (London, 1990), pp.307-24. 37. See Robert R. King, 'Romania', in Richard F. Staar, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs [YICA] 1988 (Stanford, 1988), pp. 304- 12, esp. p. 307. 38. Nicolae's brother, Lt. Gen. Ilie Ceausescu, was chief of the Main Political Directorate and a First Deputy Minister of Defense. Tismaneanu, 'Personal Power and Political Crisis in Romania', p. 196. 39. Ion Ceausescu was given the post of first vice-chairman of the State Planning Committee and a member of the Council of Ministers. 40. Robert R. King, 'Romania', in Richard F. Staar, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1990 (Stanford, 1990), p. 388. 42. Pacepa, Red Horizons, p. 194. 43. On these early events, see, generally, Mary Battiata, 'In Romania, the "Slaves" Threw Off Their Chains', The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 8- l4 Jan. 1990, pp. 15-16. Tokes had also been the target of an assassination attempt on 12 November 1989. A friend of his was also murdered in September. See 'Assassination Attempt on Romanian Priest', Die Welt, 8 Nov. 1989, p. I. 44. Mary Battiata and Blane Harden, 'Romania: The Rally Backfired: People Cried "Freedom" and Ceausescu Seemed Stunned', International Herald Tribune, 15 Jan. 1990, p.5. 45. Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 34. 46. See, e.g., Victor Loupan, 'Roumanie: dans les coulisses de la revolution piegee, Le Figaro, No. 504 (6 Jan. 1990) (International Edition), pp. 44-7. 47. On Securitate troops wearing military uniforms, see Robert R. King, 'Romania', YICA 1990, p. 401. 48. David Binder, 'Ceausescu's Snipers Still at Large, Ex-Official Says'. New York Times, 29 Aug. 1990, p. A10. Both of these men had close ties to Moscow, as described in the text, and both left the government in February 1990, after declaring their 'mission over'. 49. Adevarul (Bucharest), 14 Jan. 1990, pp. I, 3. 50. See interview with Si1viu Brucan, La Stampa (Turin), translated in FBIS-EEU, 2 April 1990, Annex, pp. 10-11. 52. Budapest Domestic Service, 1100GMT, 22 Dec. 1989, trans.in FBIS- EEU, 22 Dec. 1989, p.65. 53. AZI (Bucharest), 5 Sept. 1990, pp. 1, 3-5. 55. While at the station, the entire Council was nearly wiped out in a fierce assault by Securitate forces loyal to Ceausescu. A ground attack that resulted in the capture of the first floor of the building (the NSF HQ was located on the 12th), was co-ordinated with an assassination attempt against Ion Iliescu, as well as strafing attacks by a helicopter. 56. AZI (Bucharest), 5 Sept. 1990, pp. I, 3-5. 57. According to the poet Mircea Dinescu. See Tineretul Liber, 31 March 1990, as described in Michael Shafir, 'New Revelations of the Military's Role in Ceausescu's Ouster', Radio Free Europe: Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1, No. 19 (11 May 1990), p. 26. 58. Newsbrief (RUSI), Vol. 10, No. 5 (May 1990), pp. 33-5. 59. See Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 35. 60. See, e.g., comments of Silviu Brucan in interview with Silviu Brucan by Andrea Tarquini, La Repubblica (Rome), 4 Jan. 1990, p. 10, trans. in FBIS-EEU, I0 Jan. 1990, pp. 68-9. 61. Kostyal had reportedly been demoted to the rank of private in June 1970. 62. See Cuvintul, No. 5 (28 Feb. 1990), as described in Shafir, 'New Revelations of the Military's Role in Ceausescu's Ouster'. 63. See interview with Army General Nicolae Militaru and Professor Silviu Brucan by Darie Novaceanu, 'The Truth and Nothing But the Truth', Adevarul (Bucharest). 23 Aug. 1990, pp.1, 3, trans. in FBIS- EEU, 27 Aug. 1990, pp. 38-42. See also, Rompres (Bucharest), 1425GMT, 23 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 23 Aug. 1990, p. 29. 64. Radu's rank at the time of the revolt has been given in different sources as either colonel or captain. 65. 'Les cinq actes d'une manipulation', p.43. Magureanu was also identified as a former Securitate officer who worked primarily in Transylvania in Foreign Report (The Economist), No. 214I (20 Dec. 1990), p. 3. On Radu's identification of Magureanu as a Securitate officer, see Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 35. 66. See Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 32. 70. Iliescu is known to have publicly expressed opposition to Ceausescu's policies as early as 1971. See Interview with Prime Minister Petre Roman, Excelsior (Mexico City), 5 May 1990, pp.1, 10A, 11A. 71. Described in Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 39. 73. Interview with Militaru and Brucan by Novaceanu, 'The Truth and Nothing But the Truth'. 74. See Shafir, 'New Revelations of the Military's Role in Ceausescu's Ouster', p. 25; and Rompres (Bucharest), 1425GMT, 23 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 23 Aug. 1990, p.29. 76. 'Les cinq actes d'une manipulation', p.44. 77. Interview with Militaru and Brucan by Novaceanu, 'The Truth and Nothing But the Truth', p.40. 78.The other five were Gheorghe Apostol (former RCP first secretary), Alexandru Birladeanu (former deputy prime minister), Corneliu Manescu (former chairman of the UN General Assembly), Constantin Pirvulescu (former Politburo member), and Grigore Raceanu. 79.See Emil Munteanu, 'An Unapproved Revolution', Romania Libera, 28 Feb. 1990, pp.I, 3, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 12 March 1990, pp. 69-70. 80. Sovetskaya Molodezh, 14 June 1989, p.2. 81. Robert R. King, 'Romania', YICA 1990, p. 393. 82.See AFP (Paris), I73IGMT, 2 Jan. 1990, in FBIS-EEU, 3 Jan. 1990, p. 83. 83.See Michael Shafir, 'Ceausescu's Overthrow: Popular Uprising or Moscow-guided Conspiracy?', Radio Free Europe: Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. I, No. 3 (19 Jan. 1990), pp. l5-19, esp. p. 17. 84.Adevarul, 23 Aug. 1990, as described in Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 29. 85. Le Monde, 26-27 Aug. 1990, as described in Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p.31. 86. 'Les cinq actes d'une manipulation', p.44. 87. Simion Alexandru, 'NSF-RCP', Dreptatea (Bucharest), 4 April 1990, p. 1, trans. in FBIS-EEU, II April 1990, p.48. 89. Michael Shafir has raised the possibility that the interview was an attempt at 'myth making' by two disgruntled former members of Iliescu's original government. See Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', pp. 29-42. 90. The existence of this group was confirmed by Silviu Brucan and Nicolae Radu in a separate interview. See Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 34. 91. See Binder, 'Ceausescu's Snipers'. 92. Interview with Militaru and Brucan by Novaceanu, 'The Truth and Nothing But the Truth', p.40. 93. See Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future', p.33. 95. See, e.g., 'Les cinq actes d'une manipulation'; and Michel Castex, Un messonge gros comme le siecle: Roumanie, histoire d'une manipulation (Paris, 1990). 96. See, generally, Eyal, 'The Case of Romania: a Lesson for East and West'. 97. Amid growing tensions between Hungary and Romania, Soviet officials chose not to intervene, but instead stressed the need for bilateral dialogue (of which there was plenty, but without much success). See King, 'Romania', YICA 1988, p. 31 I. See also 'Romanian- Hungarian Ethnic Dispute', in S. E. de Banzie, et al., khe RUSI So vie Warsaw Pact Yearbook 1989 (Coulsdon, 1989), pp. 282-90. 98. Robert R. King, 'Romania', YICA 1990, p.400. 99. Robert R. King, 'Romania', YICA 1988, p. 308-9. 101. Facts on File, 29 May 1987, p.391. 102. Sauerwein and Plugge, 'Glasnost in the Romanian Armed Forces', p. 1611. 103. Quoted in Michael Waller, 'Peace, Power and Protest, Eastern Europe in the Gorbachev Era', Conflict Studies, No. 209 (London, 1988), p. 16. 104. On Romanian-Chinese ties between 1986 and 1988, see 'Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu Visit China', Romania 13/88, Radio Free Europe Research, Vol. 13, No. 45 (11 Nov. 1988), PartIII, pp. 9-10. 106. Quoted in Robert R. King, 'Romania', YICA 1989, p. 355. 107. See 'Romania: Explosive', Eastern Europe Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 13 (29 June 1988), pp. l-2. 108. 'Les cinq actes d'une manipulation', p.43. 109. Radu Portocala, 'Roumanie: La main de Moscou (suite)', Le Point, No. 903 (8 Jan. 1990), pp. 54-5. 110. 'Les cinq actes d'une manipulation', p. 45. 112. See 'Situation Report: "Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu Visit the USSR" ', Radio Free Europe Research, Vol. 13, No. 45 (11 Nov. 1988). 113. Ibid.; and 'Situation Report: Romania', SR/7, Radio Free Europe Research, Vol. 13, No.21 (27 May 1988), pp. 3-4. 114. See Moscow Television Service, 1800GMT, 31 Jan. 1989, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Soviet Un ion (hereafter cited as FBIS-SOV), 1 Feb. 1989, p.45. 115. See Jonathan Eyal, 'Romania: Looking for Weapons of Mass Destruction?' Jan Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. I, No. 8 (Aug. 1989), pp. 378-82. 117. MTI (Budapest), 0939GMT, 16 May 1989, in FBIS-EEU, 24 May 1989, p. 37. 118. Romania is reported to have called for this emergency meeting in early May 1989. At the time, Ceausescu had been issuing extremely bellicose rhetoric towards Hungary, and had recently completed a journey to Czechoslovakia where he probably solicited support for a possible move against Hungary. East Germany, which was angered at the open door policy of Hungary, sided with Ceausescu on his policies towards the Hungarian minority. See Foreign Report (25 May 1989), pp. 3-4. 119. Interview with Valentin Falin, 'The New World Disorder?: The Collapse of Eastern Europe: Moscow's View', New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 22-6, esp. p.22. 121. See Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: The Strategy of Soviet Disinformation (New York, 1984), p. 146. Oleg Gordievsky reports that a number of Soviet officials who dealt with East European affairs were concerned with Ceausescu's nationalist tendencies, including the former MGB chief adviser in Bucharest (1949- 53), and later chief of the FCD, Aleksandr Sakharovsky (1956-71). Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (London, 1991), p. 481. 122. Shafir, 'Ceausescu's Overthrow: Popular Uprising or Moscow-guided Conspiracy?', p. 15. 123. Budapest Domestic Service, 0430GMT, 5 Aug. 1989, trans.in FBIS- EEU, 7 Aug. 1989, p.32. 124. Pacepa, Red Horizons, pp. 193-5. 125. Rompres (Bucharest), 0740GMT, 24 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 24 Aug. 1990, pp. 28-9. See also Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 38. 126. See Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 38. 130. The Times, 24 May 1990, p. 10. 132. After returning from the USSR, Iliescu rose quickly through party ranks and eventually served for 10 years as a non-voting member of the Politburo and a full member of the Central Committee. He was even believed at one time to have been Ceausescu's chosen successor. See The Times, 24 May 1990, p. 10. 134. Tismaneanu, 'Personal Power and Political Crisis in Romania', p. 197. 135. See Shafir, 'Ceausescu's Overthrow: Popular Uprising or Moscow- guided Conspiracy?', p.18. 136. The Times, 2 March 1990, p.9. 137. See 'Justice: Iulian Vlad Trial - Witnesses' Marathon Goes On', Rompres (Bucharest), 1733GMT, 16 Oct. 1990, in FBIS-EEU, 17 Oct. 1990, p.49. 138. 'Was This Your Revolution? This is How It Was!' Democratia, No. 36 (24-30 Sept. 1990), p.4, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 25 Oct. 1990, pp. 50- 52. 139. Kosta Christitch, 'Roumanie: Le jeu cache de Moscou', Le Point, No. 902 (1 Jan. 1990), pp. 34-6. 140. 'Les cinq actes d'une manipulation', p.43. 141. KrasnayaZvezda, 4 July 1989, p.3. 142. Krasnaya Zvezda, 2 July 1989, p. 3. 143. Pravda, 29 June 1989, p.4. 144. See Ronald Linden, 'Reaction to the Revolution, Part I?: The Demonstrations in Timisoara and Bucharest', Radio Free Europe: Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1, No.5 (2 Feb. 1990), pp. 33-5. 146. As quoted in Ronald Linden, 'Reaction to the Revolution, Part II: The Ceausescus Overthrow and Execution', Radio Free Europe: Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. 1, No. 5 (2 Feb. 1990), p. 37. 148. The report was made by a Romanian army officer on Romanian Television. Shafir adequately debunks the speculation by Anneli Ute Gabanyi that Moscow had mobilized two divisions on the Romanian border for a possible intervention. See Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 37. 149. In June 1971, while Ceausescu was visiting China, Moscow conducted extensive exercises on Romania's borders, excluded it from a Warsaw Pact meeting, and requested that three Soviet divisions be allowed to transit through Romanian territory, purportedly on their way to exercises in Bulgaria. See Stephen S. Kaplan, et al, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, DC, 1981), pp. 84-5. 150. Both the French and US governments made public statements at the height of the fighting, stating that they would not oppose a Soviet intervention. in the American case, this statement rejected a long- standing policy of opposition to Soviet military intervention into Eastern Europe. If Moscow had intervened it could have been disastrous for American policy, for it would have strengthened those in the Politburo and military who were arguing against a Soviet troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Ryzhkov seemed to take exception to the Embassy's statement in an interview given to a journalist on 23 December, in which he rejected the use of force in any circumstance. Ryzhkov's statement and the notice given by the Embassy suggest that there was a sharp difference over policy in the Politburo and that Ryzhkov ultimately prevailed: fortunately for the Bush administration. See AFP (Paris), IS00GMT, 23 Dec. 1989, in FBIS-SOV, 26 Dec. 1989, p. 13. 151. Linden, 'Reaction to the Revolution, Part i?: The Demonstrations in Timisoara and Bucharest', p. 37. 152. Gorbachev announced this fact to the Congress of People's Deputies on 23 December. See Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 37. 153. Captain Mihai Lupoi (original NSF Council member), interview with Radio Free Europe, as reported in Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 37. 154. Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, 24 Dec. 1989. 155. See TASS, 1438GMT, 25 Dec. 1989, trans. in FBIS-SOV, 26 Dec. 1989, p. 1; The Boston Sunday Globe, 24 Dec. 1989, p. 7; and, Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 38. 156. See statements of Hungarian Army Colonel Gyorgi Keleti on Budapest Domestic Service, 1925GMT, 24 Dec. 1989, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 26 Dec. 1989, pp. 45-6. Among the data furnished was information on Securitate radio transmitters given to the Romanian military: see MTI (Budapest), 1402GMT, 25 Dec. 1989, in FBIS-EEU, 26 Dec. 1989, pp. 46-7. 157. Komsomolskaya Pravda (Moscow), 23 Sept. 1990, p. 3. 158. See, generally, Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 35. 160. See, generally, ibid., p. 34. 161. See interview with Militaru and Brucan by Novaceanu, 'The Truth', p.40. 162. Bucharest Domestic Service, 1213GMT, 22 Dec. 1989, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 22 Dec. 1989, pp. 67-8. 163. Bucharest Domestic Service, 1309GMT, 22 Dec. 1989, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 22 Dec. 1989, p.67. 164. Vladimir V. Kusin, 'The Secret Police: Disliked and Weakened, But Not Beaten Yet', Radio Free Europe: Report on Eastern Europe, Vol. I, No. 6 (9 Feb. 1990), p. 37. 165. Bucharest Domestic Service, 1800GMT, 20 Feb. 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 21 Feb. 1990, pp. 50-51. 166. mendgen.de, 'The Secret Police: Disliked and Weakened, But Not Beaten Yet', p. 37. See also Le Monde, 23 Feb. 1990, p. 3; Bucharest Domestic Service, 2003GMT, 1 Jan. 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 2 Jan. 1990, p.48. 167. See Binder, 'Ceausescu's Snipers'. 168. Penciuc's ties to the conspiracy have been discussed by both Militaru and Radu. See, generally, Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p.36. 170. See interview with Militaru and Brucan by Novaceanu, 'The Truth', p.41. 171. See 'Picture of the Revolution - Commentary by President Iliescu', Rompres (Bucharest), 0941GMT, 28 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS- EEU, 29 Aug. 1990, pp. 589. 172. See Rompres (Bucharest), 0740GMT, 24 Aug. 1990, trans. in FBIS- EEU, 24 Aug. 1990, pp. 28-9. Vlad had also refused to disclose contingency plans for Securitate troops to the NSF Council. See Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 36. 173. See 'Justice: Iulian Vlad Trial - Witnesses' Marathon Goes On', p.49. 174. See Sturdza, 'How Dead Is Ceausescu's Secret Police Force?', pp. 30-31. 175. See Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', p. 36. 176. Bucharest Domestic Service, 1410GMT, 31 Dec. 1989, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 2 Jan. 1990, p.57. 177. See Sturdza, 'How Dead Is Ceausescu's Secret Police Force?', p.29. 178. The role of Arab terrorists from the PLO, Syria, and Libya, who were training in Romania at the time is discussed in Shafir, 'Preparing for the Future by Revising the Past', pp. 36-7, and note 35. 179. Interview with Ion Iliescu in Le Monde, 28 Feb. 1990, pp. 1,4. 180. See Sturdza, 'How Dead Is Ceausescu's Secret Police Force?', p.31. 182. Dreptatea, 7 Oct. 1990, p.3. 183. LeMonde, 23 Feb. 1990, p.3, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 26 Feb. 1990, p.3. 184. See Sturdza, 'How Dead Is Ceausescu's Secret Police Force?',p.31. Also, Virgil Magureanu on Bucharest Domestic Service, 1200GMT, 22 Nov. 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 27 Nov. 1990, pp. 54-9. 185. Romania Libera, 6 Feb. 1990, p.1. 186. See Rompres (Bucharest), 1621GMT, 19 Feb. 1990, trans. in FBIS- EEU, 26 Feb. 1990, p.68. 187. An official government biography of Stanculescu does not point to any obvious connection to the USSR, except that he is able to read fiction in Russian, which would be difficult to do without extensive Russian-language study. See Rompres, 1622GMT, 17 Feb. 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 23 Feb. 1990, 71; and Bucharest Domestic Service, 1600GMT, 17 Feb. 1990, trans. in FBIS-EEU, 20 Feb. 1990, p. 60. 188. Quoted in Sturdza, 'How Dead Is Ceausescu's Secret Police Force?', p. 33. 189. Upon taking control of the Ministry of Defense in December, Militaru had appointed to posts in the ministry of defense at least 16 retired generals. Newsbrief (RUSI), Vol. 10, No. 5 (May 1990), p. 34. See also interview with Captain Nicolae Eremie in Romania Libera, 17 Feb. 1990, pp. 1-2. Militaru's actions alienated younger military officers. In February 1990, representatives of an Air Force garrison and the Technical Military Academy of Timisoara issued an appeal calling for, among other things, that the 'generals reactivated during the Revolution be retired from the Army'. Romania Libera, 14 Feb. 1990, p. 1; and, The Times, 22 May 1990, p. 10. 190. The Times, 22 May 1990, p. 10. 192. The Times, 16 May 1990, p. 10. See also 'Former Romanian Spy Says Securitate Still Active', Reuter Library Report, 19 Jan. 1993. 193. See, e.g., Roman Rollnick, 'Communism's Chameleons', The European, 18-20 May 1990, p.3. 194. See Sturdza, 'How Dead Is Ceausescu's Secret Police Force?' | |
